Skinner’s framework for behavior in the 1950s: One step away from selectionism

Abstract

“Selection by consequences” is an important topic to Behavior Analysis, because it
refers to an explanatory mode for the psychological phenomenon that is alternative to other
traditional explanations. Furthermore, it seems to be precisely “selectionism” that allows the
investigation of the compatibility of different intervention proposals, with the philosophical
premises assumed and adopted by Skinner’s behaviorism. Despite the importance of the
notion of selection by consequences for the delimitation of the field of interest of Behavior
Analysis, and for the application of this science in studies on human behavior, this work
has two objectives. Based on three aspects previously suggested as defining the selectionist
explanatory principle, it is intended to present aspects of Skinner’s writings published in the
1950s that can elucidate the process of constructing the notion of selection by consequences.
Furthermore, it seeks to highlight how the classic Science and Human Behavior is central to
understanding how such aspects were historically constructed and how some key terms were
explored in this book. It is concluded that this is a transitional period, in which this principle
was not completely consolidated, since selectionism did not reflect at that time an alternative
notion of causality.